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Although the M'Naughten test of criminal
irresponsibility is now more than 120 years old,
and has been applied in hundreds of cases, one
ambiguity in its wording has never been resolved:
does the criterion of whether the accused knew
that the criminal act was "wrong" mean legally
wrong or morally wrong? Few cases have even
discussed the question, and those that have, have
disagreed in their answers.'
The American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code specifically declines to resolve the issue.
In its tentative drafts, it did undertake to do so;
as then worded the Code spoke of capacity to
appreciate the "criminality" of the act. But the
Proposed Official Draft of 1962 inserted, as an
alternative term, "wrongfulness". 2 The comments
'Some cases have held that "wrong" means legal
wrong, i.e., knowledge that the act was prohibited by
law. State v. Foster, 44 H. 403, 354 P.2d 960 (1960);
State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 438, 357 P.2d 739 (1960).
This is also the interpretation adopted in a leading
English case, R v. Windle [1952] 2 Q.B. 826, 2 All
Eng. 1. The leading case to the contrary, holding that
in proper circumstances the word ought not to be
limited to legal wrong, is People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y.
324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915). In State v. Kirkham, 7
Utah 2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 (1958), the Court deliberately used the disjunctive and said that a defendant
is to be acquitted if he either did not know that the
act was wrong morally or did not know it was prohibited by law. See also People v. Benton, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 301 P.2d 620 (1956); People v.
McDonough, 198 Cal. App. 2d 84, 17 Cal. Rptr. 643
(1961); State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148 A.2d 251,
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 921 (1959); State v. Thorne, 239
S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961).
2 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requiremtnts of
law." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code,
§4.01(1).

to the Code give no arguments for preferring one
over the other. Legislatures or courts considering
adopting the Code's formulation are thus given
no help in deciding which word to choose.3
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the
preferable word is "wrongfulness."
If we are to hold a person mentally responsible
for his criminal act unless he is so disordered as
to be unable to appreciate its criminality, we
shall have to condemn as responsible and fit for
punishment some of the most wildly disordered
persons ever seen-for example, persons with
elaborately developed delusions who hear "voices"
and who kill while believing that the deed was
commanded by God. Such a person may know
full well that the act was a violation of the temporal law. He may even commit it precisely because he knows it is criminal: believing that he
is the reincarnation of Jesus Christ, ordained
again to suffer execution, he commits an act that
will bring about that result. As long ago as 1800,
just such a case was tried in England. That was
3In Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1963), the Court in
adopting the code wording repeated it verbatim, with
"wrongfulness" in brackets following "criminality,"
thus leaving unresolved the choice between them. In
the important case of United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966), the court specifically chose
"wrongfulness" instead of "criminality" because "we
wish to include the case where the perpetrator appreciates that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a
delusion, believes it to be morally justified". Id. at
622, n. 52. Illinois and Vermont have by statute
adopted the Model Penal Code wording in the earlier
version using the word "criminality". Smith-Hurd's
.ll. Ann. Stat., c. 38, Sec. 6-2 (1964); Vt. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 13, Sec. 4801 (1958). Kentucky in 1963 adopted
the Code formula by judicial action, including the same
interpretation ("that he was violating the law").
Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
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the famous case of Hadfield, 4 a war veteran who
had been discharged from the British army on
the ground of insanity. He was suffering from
systematized delusions that, like Christ, he was
called upon to sacrifice himself for the world's
salvation. He therefore shot at King George III,
so that by the appearance of crime he might be
condemned, and thereby lay down his life as he
felt divinely called upon to do. Hadfield was
acquitted on the ground of insanity, largely because of the brilliant handling of the case by his
counsel, Lord Erskine. Under the "criminality"
wording of the Model Code formula, it would seem
that latter-day Hadfields would have to be condemned.
The famous M'Naughten's case 5 itself, from
which the present rule derives, involved a defendant suffering from delusions of persecutions
of exactly the sort just described. To quote from
M'Naughten's own testimony:"
The Tories in my native city have compelled
me to do this. They follow and persecute me
wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed
my peace of mind. They followed me to
France, into Scotland and all over England;
in fact, they follow me wherever I go. I can
get no rest from them night or day. I cannot sleep at night in consequence of the
course they pursue towards me. I believe
they have driven me into a consumption.
I am sure I shall never be the man I formerly
was. I used to have good health and strength,
but I have not now. They have accused me
of crimes of which I am not guilty; they do
everything in their power to harass and
persecute me; in fact they wish to murder
me. It can be proved by evidence. That's all
I have to say.
M'Naughten was found not guilty by reason of
insanity. But if we adopt the first, and apparently
preferred, wording of the Model Code, such paranoiacs will presumably have to be convicted-if
the jury follows the instructions on the law.
Actually, I doubt whether a jury in our day would
be any more willing to convict such a person than
was M'Naughten's jury in 1843. But then they
427 How. St. Tr. 1281.
5 10 Clark & Fin. 200.

6Quoted in Ellison and Haas, A Recent Judicial
Interpretation of the M'Naghten Rule, 4 BRIT. J. OF
DELINQuENCY 129 (1953); and in Roche, Criminality
and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22

U. Cm. L. REv. 320, 324 (1955).
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would have to flout the law. Surely we should not
impose legal rules so harsh that juries will gag
at applying them, especially by adopting a form
of wording whose broad purpose is to liberalize
the historic test.
Dr. Charles Mercier forty years ago denounced
such a narrow view. "As well," he said, "might
we convict of high treason the general paralytic
who claims the crown of England. He knows
that the world considers wrong the act that he
does. He knows that it is against the law. But he
does not know and appreciate the circumstances
7
in which he acts".
This restriction calls for a legalistic approach
that would seem absurd to anyone but lawyers.
Suppose a fairly typical paranoid case, where the
person has delusions of persecution-like
M'Naughten's. He thinks "they" are after him.
"They" may be "the Tories", or they may be
"the Catholics" or "the Masons", or he may be
unable to make clear just who he thinks "they"
are. But they are after him. When he walks along
the street they follow him. At work or at home,
he feels their eyes upon him; always he sees them
lurking. At night they peek through his windows.
They send noxious fumes through the keyhole
to poison him; they send deadly rays right through
the walls; they send sound waves by radar,
mocking him and telling him that he is in their
power. Driven to desperation by this incessant
hounding, one day he turns and shoots someone
on the street who he believes is one of "them".
To determine whether this man should more
properly be sent to a mental hospital or to prison
or to the electric chair by asking whether he
knew that his act was criminal would be ridiculous. First of all, it might be a nice question
for lawyers and judges themselves to ponder
whether the act was criminal or not. Perhaps
this could be deemed self-defense. Whether it
was or was not might depend upon whether the
defendant thought they were trying to kill him
or merely to mock, harass, and bedevil him.
Even if he thought his life was in danger, it might
make a difference whether he thought the danger
was direct, as by shooting poisonous fumes into
his bedroom, or indirect, as where they were
trying to drive him out of his mind, or drive him
to suicide. Even if direct, and if he thought the
man he shot was one of those who were trying to
kill him, was it criminal to shoot him at a moment
7MERCILR, CRInMNAL REsPONSIBILITY 193 (1926).
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when the man was not making any such attempt,
but was only following him? Should the defendant
have run away and called the police instead of
shooting, if it was safe to do so, and did he think
it was safe?
Suppose the reason he did not call the police
is that he had already complained repeatedly to
the police, but had-as we can understand, but
he could not-got no help from them. Suppose he
knew that taking the law into one's own hands is
ordinarily not permitted, but he felt he had no
other recourse?
The legal technicalities involved make this a
pretty good law school examination question, on
which normal and intelligent law students might
exercise their powers of legal reasoning. To ask
whether a mentally disordered person was able to
appreciate the "criminality" of his actions in
such a situation is preposterous. We can say of
this rule what Judge Ladd said of the so-called
"mistake of fact rule"-a part of the rules laid
down in M'Naughten's case which is now generally disregarded-the rule that a person laboring
under "partial delusions" only "must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility
as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
exists were true". Of that rule Judge Ladd said
many years ago .
... it is probable that no ingenious student
of the law ever read it for the first time without
being shocked by its exquisite inhumanity.
It practically holds a man confessed to be
insane, accountable for the exercise of the
same reason, judgment, and controlling mental
power, that is required of a man in perfect
health. It is, in effect, saying to the jury, the
prisoner was mad when he committed the act,
but he did not use sufficient reason in his
madness.

Many mentally ill persons are grappling with
very profound issues of spiritual life. They are
trying to deal with their failure to measure up
to the moral standard that they have accepted
for themselves. Very frequently, they show a
strong religious concern. The original problem
takes on cosmic and universal form. It becomes
a struggle between good and evil, between God
and Satan. They feel themselves in tune with
some mighty cosmic force which they are likely
to personalize under the name of God. They see
8 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1971).

themselves in the leading role of a great cosmic
drama, the kind of role in which the old Hebrew
prophets saw themselves.
A young man of strict religious upbringing
finds himself tormented by a strong sex urge.
This leads him to yield to fantasies and to actions
that his conscience tells him are immoral and
sinful. This conflict may dramatize itself to his
mind not merely as one between his better and his
worse self. He may develop a delusional system
in which he sees himself as God's champion in
the universal conflict between good and evil.
One day he strangles a prostitute with whom he
has had relations. He says, in justification, "She
was evil; she was a tool of the devil". It would
be petty legalism to try to determine his mental
responsibility by asking simply whether he appreciated the "criminality" of the act. Of course
he did. But for him the conflict was on a much
higher plane. He killed under a paranoiac delusion
that he was carrying out God's will by destroying
the very personification of evil. To execute such
a person as mentally responsible for his act would
shock the sensibilities of any civilized community.
In a sense the mentally ill defendant may be
a more moral person than the criminal. The
former is often one who by standards that he
accepts as his own, stands condemned as unworthy. He cannot bear the thought that those
who are nearest and dearest to him should know
him as he is. He thus becomes isolated from those
who are closest to him and whose approval he
wants. His battle is being fought out within.
The true criminal, on the other hand, is one
whose imagination has never been kindled by
any such ideal, and who when he found the ethical
standards of his family and friends too difficult
to maintain, gave them up and accepted those of
some gang whose code was closer to his own
practices. This corruption of morals will probably
at least save his sanity, for a man is not likely to
fall victim to a psychosis so long as he can belong
to some group to whose standards he can conform.
The "standards" may consist largely of verbalizations. We do not merely rationalize acts we
have already done or determined upon. We also
act because we have rationalized. A businessman
may undertake a shady transaction because he
tells himself that "business is business". Simpler
minds expecially are inclined to accept a pat or
currently accepted verbal clich6 as if it were a
reason. "I'm a chip off the old block", says a
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delinquent boy whose father was indeed an old
reprobate. The father's influence was no doubt
important, but the verbality makes it easier for
the boy to follow his pattern. The people who are
within or on the margin of the criminal group are
not wholly isolated from the ethical ideas of the
other members of the society in which they all
live. They all know that society condemns killing,
stealing and lying, and most of them have not
consciously and by logical process refuted and
rejected these precepts. More likely, they have
made some superficial reconciliation of them by
use of some handy cliches. Though killing is
wrong, bumping off a squealer is different. Stealing
from the rich, who will never miss it, is not like
ordinary stealing. Certain forms of dishonesty
are not like ordinary cheating, because "everybody
does it". In our society, cliches are particularly
potent. We are so accustomed to having hucksters
use them on us in high pressure advertising that
we tend also to use them to "sell" ourselves.
The criminal is not being peculiarly a criminal
in this pattern of conduct. He is being a human
being. The average, the "normal", man is apt
to do the same sort of thing-to seek the solution
of conflicts between his ideas and his mundane
urges by socializing them with a lowered threshold
of conscience, and comforting himself with the
thought that he is no worse than his neighbor.
Even the Church, the institution that stands for
the ethical standards we deem most permanent
and universal, has constantly had to find shortcuts and devices that will enable it to bolster up
the moral self-respect of its members when they
fail to live up to an ideal that is, alas, too high
for most mortals to maintain. It therefore introduces confessions, absolutions, and other devices to remove some of the weight of guilt feelings;
it overemphasizes credal conformity; it makes
much of ritual, and in other ways tends to substitute minor for major virtues and loyalties.
It is easy for skeptics to point to this tendency
with scorn or with sadness, but it is probably
necessary. The effort to maintain the high ideals
of any enlightened religion would probably collapse if people were not given such encouragements in the face of human frailty.
So the mentally ill person and the criminal are
not alone in this problem. Every human being
judges himself by the standards of the person
or group with whom he seeks to identify. For the
sake of his own mental health, he must belong to
some group. If he cannot bring himself within
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some group whose standards he can meet, whose
standards will serve to justify himself to himself,
he will be isolated and destroyed.
The standards by which we judge ourselves are
not merely the rock-bottom prohibitions of the
criminal law. Rather they are the affirmative
standards and ideals of the group with which
we wish to identify. This is not necessarily the
group to which we have belonged; it is the group
to which we aspire to belong. Conscience is not
merely backward looking; it lies, as someone has
put it, on the growing edge of human nature.
If we are to employ appreciation of wrongfulness
as a legal test, it is unrealistic to limit it to appreciation of illegality. This is a sterile, armchair
logician's test. Its logic, admittedly, is impeccable:
the law is concerned only with legality. If a person
had understanding enough to appreciate that the
act was criminal, but nevertheless commits it,
he is responsible. In the words of Isaac Ray, "It
is very reasonable, if insane men would but listen
to reason". But what Holmes said about law and
logic is certainly applicable here. Experience, as
distinguished from logic, will show that disordered minds do not reason this way. There are
no types of mental disorder in which the patient
is typically deluded about the legality of his act.
Cases may be found, perhaps, where the facts as
imagined might constitute self-defense, for example. But much more often, the act is known to
violate the temporal law, but it is committed
nevertheless because of delusions involving transcendental issues of eternal righteousness. Limiting the defense to delusions about criminality is
not only shockingly harsh; it is also scientifically
ignorant.
This restrictive formulation in its harshness
might even permit the judges to prevent the jury
from tempering law with mercy, as an English
case decided in 1952 illustrates. In that case,
R. v. Windle,9 although the defendant pleaded
insanity, the evidence was uncontroverted that
he knew that his act, giving his wife a hundred
aspirin tablets, was illegal. The trial judge therefore took the case away from the jury. The Court
of Criminal Appeal upheld him.
The High Court of Australia, in a case decided
soon after the Winudle case, expressly refused to
follow it and held instead that "wrong" means
morally wrong. 10 The same has been held in
9 R. v. Windle [1952] 2 Q.B. 826, 2 All Eng. 1.
10Stapleton v. The Queen, 86 Commonwealth Law
Rep. 358 (Aust. 1952). For a debate prompted by the
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Scotland.u And in 1966, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in the important case of
United States v. Freeman," adopting the Model
Penal Code test, specifically substituted "wrongfulness" for "criminality" because "we wish to
include the case where the perpetrator appreciates
that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a
delusion, believes it to be morally justified."
Windle and Stapleton cases, between Norval Morris
and J. L. Montrose, see 16 MODERN L. Rtv. 435
(1953), and 17 id. 383 (1954).
" H. M. Advocate v. Sharp, cited by Mr. C. C.
Cunningham, Permanent Secretary, Scottish Home
Dept., before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minuis of Evidence, pp. 77, 78, par. 581, 511.
12United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1966). A New York Commission on Revision in 1964
recommended amending the state Penal Law, Sec.
1120, so as to adopt essentially the Model Penal Code
wording, but using "wrongfulness" instead of "criminality". Temporary State Commission on Revision of
the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Proposed New
York Penal Law, p. B-4.

People to whom certainty is the most important
desideratum should be delighted with the result
in the English case. That is exactly how a clear
and precise rule should work: easily and simply,
like using a yardstick. But the High Court of
Australia and the Court of Appeals in the Freeman case seem right in rejecting such a restrictive
interpretation. A yardstick is too simple an instrument for measuring human behavior. It is
better to leave the matter to the jury's discretion,
guided by expert testimony as to the defendant's
mental condition, than to have it disposed of in
this summary and narrow fashion by the judge.
To adopt the word "criminality" instead of
"wrongfulness" in the wording of the Model
Penal Code's test of mental irresponsibility would
be a long step backward. It would subvert the
liberalizing purpose behind all the other changes
in the wording of the test that the Code would
make.

